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Changes of status in states of political uncertainty: 
towards a social theory of derecognition 
 
This article examines existing versions of recognition theory, which is typically 
concerned with the enfranchisement of previously subaltern groups. Looking at 
several empirical case studies of social practices from twentieth-century 
history, it draws attention to the importance of status loss and the depreciation 
of value in periods of political rupture, particularly after the First World War. To 
conceptualise such examples, we need an expansion in the existing vocabulary 
of recognition theory. The article proposes ways to develop a theory of 
derecognition which might be used to guide empirical research on informal 
practices of political change.  
 
 
Theories of recognition have been widely used to analyse processes of political 
legitimation. Recognition is seen as a practice of acknowledging a ʻpartner in 
intersubjective interactionʼ, as a result of which each subject or group is not 
only formally enfranchised but also achieves equal status in informal interaction 
(Honneth 1994). Practices of recognition enable societies to transcend forms of 
subjectivity grounded on a ʻfalse, distorted, and reduced mode of beingʼ, and 
contribute to social equality by incorporating subaltern groups (Taylor 1982, 25). 
Due to its emphasis on diachronic aspects of social practice and non-
institutional types of agency, recognition theory is particularly suited to 
interdisciplinary empirical research involving historical studies of reforms, 
revolutions, and other forms of political rupture. In this article, I am interested 
in looking more closely at the conceptual vocabulary of recognition theory in 
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this context. My hope is to expand this vocabulary in order to account for 
aspects of political change which have not been fully captured by existing 
approaches. By states of uncertainty I mean, broadly, a situation typically 
encompassing the lifetime of one generation, in which the status of 
governments, individuals or groups, and even of things and artefacts, is called 
into question. In these contexts, the value of statuses and artefacts remains 
uncertain over protracted periods of time. But in large sections of this article, I 
am going to be exploring more specific examples of uncertainty in the aftermath 
of the First World War and the Russian and German revolutions.  
Like some other theoretical models which help explain changing forms of 
legitimation, such as social contract theory, recognition theory undermines 
primordialist or organicist conceptions of justice and power. In particular, 
recognition theorists aspire to provide an account of positive change which 
includes formerly inferior groups in the social process. However, due to this 
perspective, which naturally foregrounds the enfranchisement of subalterns, 
recognition theorists often disregard the fact that such forms of progressive 
transformation are often accompanied by ʻnegativeʼ processes, including, 
notably, the political delegitmation of social groups and governments. It is these 
types of process that I am concerned with here. I suggest that they could be 
usefully captured through the concept of ʻderecognitionʼ, which might form a 
theoretical complement to existing approaches in recognition theory.  
The notion of derecognition [abrogatio, Aberkennung, déconnaissance] 
has not made a visible foray into social theory, even though, as I will discuss, 
the term itself has been used in a range of fields for a long time. Historians and 
other disciplines studying empirical cases of political rupture would benefit from 
using the concept more systematically. Conversely, some recent historical 
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research into social practices in times of reform and revolution could also help 
refine the theoretical conceptualisation of recognition.  
At times of rapid political change, which could be viewed on a wide 
spectrum from reform to revolution (see the discussion by Skocpol 1979/2015 
or Dunn 1989), it is often the case that previously inferior, misrecognised groups 
gain acceptance. However, such moments of enfranchisement are also 
frequently accompanied by informal as well as legal action through which old 
privileges or statuses are publicly disavowed. In what follows, I shall provide a 
range of empirical and theoretical perspectives on practices of social 
transformation, including the abrogation of privileges, denaturalization, and 
discrediting previously respected individuals or groups ‒ which, I suggest, can 
be described summatively with the term ʻ derecognitionʼ. While most cases stem 
from the history of central and eastern Europe in the early to mid-twentieth 
century, the notion of derecognition as such is equally pertinent to similar 
examples from other geographical regions and periods. Before any empirical 
case studies can be discussed, however, I will first outline how recognition 
theory has developed, and where the concept of ʻderecognitionʼ might fit to 
develop it further. 
I 
The scope of recognition theory 
 
Advocates of recognition approaches have highlighted their capacity to account 
for social conflict, which utilitarian or rational models of political change, such 
as social contract theory, tend to discount (most recently, this view of 
recognition theory has been advanced in Miller 2016; but see also the classic 
formulation in Honneth 1994). Whereas social contract theorists might examine 
a supposedly transformative contractual situation or a constitutive moment in 
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which a government or entity is being empowered to represent a larger 
population, recognition theorists envisage status change as a set of repeatable 
informal processes. In this sense, theories of recognition are related both to 
socia contract theory and to constructivist theories of status and identity more 
broadly (see e.g. Rawls 1971 for a classic modern restatement of social contract 
theory; see also Searle 1990; Fraser 1989; Butler 1990; Appiah and Gutman 
1996; Anderson 1983). Despite this emphasis on practice, recognition theorists 
have also been criticised for their limited account of cultural practices and group 
identities. For instance, some recognition theorists questioned the focus on 
intersubjective recognition in Honnethʼs model of the theory, and called for a 
need to recognise the multiplicity of cultures within polities (Taylor and Gutman 
1994). Others insisted that any norm concerning intersubjective recognition 
ought to guarantee the preservation of some valued personal or group 
characteristics (Kalyvas 1999, 103; Zurn 2012, and see Honneth 2016 for a 
response). While such critiques are valid, their implications will not be covered 
in what follows, since my concern is with the more basic tenets of recognition 
theory that these criticisms do not touch upon, i.e. the focus on informal and 
repeated practice as opposed to single contractual events, imagined or real. 
The history of recognition theory itself is illuminating for understanding 
how informal social interaction is conceptualised in this framework. Most 
twentieth-century theories of recognition are indebted to G.W.F. Hegel, 
particularly, the section of Hegelʼs Philosophy of Spirit, often translated as 
ʻLordship and Bondageʼ, or, more accurately, as ʻ Lordship and Servitudeʼ (Hegel 
1807; for the reception, see Shklar 1991; Fraser 1999; Taylor 1994; Honneth 
1994, Onuf 2013). The section is now one of the most frequently cited fragments 
of his work outside the discipline of Philosophy (Beiser 2011). Hegelʼs thinking 
about social change exposed the connection between forms of consciousness 
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and progress in the real world by proposing a counterintuitive, yet compelling 
perspective on the capacity of human emancipation under conditions of social 
inequality. In this parable involving an imaginary lord and a bondsman, Hegel 
argued that in this unequal relationship, it is the bondsman and not the lord who 
has a more direct path to emancipation through self-consciousness. In legal 
terms, he is an inferior subject, but given his real experience of the world in this 
situation, which has to do with his use of labour and his material impact on the 
things that he is labouring upon, Hegel argues, the bondsman has the ability to 
access a fuller understanding of himself and others. By contrast, the lordʼs 
relationship to things in this world remains mediated through dependence on 
the bondsman, despite the fact that the bondsmain is subordinate to him in 
terms of his social status.  
In discussing the relationship of people to each other and to things in the 
framework of his philosophy of history, Hegel transferred the discussion of 
intersubjective recognition from the legal and theological spheres to political 
philosophy and metaphysics. Recognition, in the widest sense, can apply as 
much to intersubjective situations, as it can to people and their own selves. 
Subsequently, this imaginary case has been developed more fully to show that 
the social practice of recognition in this intersubjective sense can be seen as a 
key instrument of human self-emancipation.  
Before accounting for the nature of this reception, it is worth emphasising 
that Hegel himself used the word ʻrecognitionʼ (Anerkennung) itself only rarely. 
Nonetheless, even if we cannot count ʻrecognitionʼ among Hegelʼs personal 
keywords, it was certainly available to him as a concept, since it was a known 
juridical term (I use concept here in Koselleckʼs sense. Cf. Koselleck 
1973/2004). European jurists and theologians before and after Hegel had used 
the concept of ʻrecognitionʼ in the context of studies of Roman law, in the 
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practice of civil law, in comparative anthropology, and, in theological literature, 
in relation to the psychological process of acknowledging oneʼs sins (Bähr 1867; 
Leonhard 1894; Flörcke 1757). Moreover, the first generations of his readers 
were more interested in Hegelʼs concept of consciousness than recognition. 
Notably, for Marx, Hegelʼs understanding of labour as a source of self-
consciousness was threatened under conditions of modern industrial 
production, while the idea of the state, which for Hegel was the highest 
realisation of consciousness, turned out to be one of the sources of humanityʼs 
alienation from itself (Marx 1846/1932, Breckman 1999, 73 and passim). The 
theme of consciousness as a prerequisite of revolutions, which Hegelʼs theory 
had foregrounded, remained central for twentieth-century Marxists like Georg 
Lukács. According to Lukács´ elaboration on Marx´s stages theory of history, 
the degree of ´consciousness´ of historical actors of their own situation 
differed in different ages: the capitalist age, for instance, was a more conscious 
age than the precapitalist one, where class consciousness has to be won or 
extracted. (Lukács 1923).  
Thus recognition only became a key term for understanding Hegelʼs 
social thought retrospectively. Recognition theory as it is known today 
eventually developed most prominently in an Anglophone context in the 
decades following the Second World War, yet prior to this, it had been a 
prominent feature in the political thought of Russian philosophers engaged in 
rethinking revolutionary periods against the dominant narratives of orthodox 
Marxism between the 1920s and the 1940s. One of the key twentieth-century 
sources of thinking about recognition was the influential reading advanced by 
Alexandre Kojève in his interwar and wartime lectures in Paris (Kojève 1947, 
2014). For Kojève, the central force of Hegelʼs theory was the focus on 
consciousness as an agent of history, and within it, his description of the desire 
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to be recognised by others and to develop self-consciousness. Kojèveʼs 
influential conceptualization of ʻrecognitionʼ in French, American and postwar 
German thought allowed to rediscover Hegel´s concept of conscousness 
independently from the idea of a class struggle, presenting it as an 
intersubjective process reflecting the human desire for identity (Taylor 1975; 
Butler 1987; Honneth 1994 and 2003; Jagentowicz Mills 1996; Pippin 2011).. The 
idea of human agency in social transformation had changed, as Kojèveʼs 
students proceeded to ascribe particular historical significance to the 
psychological history of revolutions, which they conceptualized as the moment 
when a recent object of misrecognition, or a non-recognised group, becomes a 
new subject capable of recognising others. Psychoanalytic schools of thought, 
such as that of Donald Winnicott and his followers (Winnicott 1965), drew on 
this concept in explaining the process of maturation by which a child acquires 
recognition from the mother. Gender theorists describe the recognition of the 
person of ʻtroubledʼ gender by the heterosexual majority.  
A second important source for twentieth-century ideas of recognition 
drew its inspiration from  Hegelʼs work on Aesthetics, though the reception of 
the concept of recognition in this area has evolved along quite separate lines 
from that of Hegelʼs political thought (Hegel 1823, 1998, 2014). One of the key 
figures in this context was the Russian philosopher Gustav Špet. ʻIn order for 
something to be socially real, socially valuable,ʼ wrote Špet in 1936, ʻ the relevant 
society must recognize it. Recognition (come on, old man: Anerkennung) is a 
determinative [sic!] category of the social!ʼ (Plotnikov 2013, 223, citing Špet 
2005, 389). Working in revolutionary Russia, Špet had been part of a circle of 
avangarde theorists who wanted to bridge science and art in capturing the 
relationship of representation to reality in a revolutionary (Špet 1922).  
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In the long run, however, Špetʼs work was forgotten in the wider 
international context of social theory. The next significant ‒ and, for a wide 
range of reasons, much more widely known -- reception period of Hegelʼs 
Aesthetics in terms of recognition theory did not start until the work of Arthur 
Danto, who used it to develop a constructivist theory of art (Danto 1998, Danto 
2014). However, in the end it was Kojève´s interpretation which had the 
greatest influence on a number of subsequent social theorists, including Judith 
Butler, Charles Taylor and Robert Pippin. For them, the continued relevance of 
Hegelʼs concept lies in his emphasis on reason being a social process, rather 
than an ideal (Taylor and Gutman 1982, Butler 1990, Pippin 2011). What unites 
these later twentieth-century and early twenty-first century readings of Hegel 
is the observation that the chief role in bringing about revolutionary change 
belongs to the formerly inferior object as a decisive subject of historical change. 
The bourgeois becomes a revolutionary agent, the child becomes an adult, etc., 
and only when the former object of misrecognition has become an active 
subject can revolutionary change occur. At each historical moment when a new 
identity is recognised, ʻrecognitionʼ is revealed as a driving force of history.  
For the political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, the model for the gradual 
expansion of rights in the modern age is derived from the practice of 
ennoblement (Waldron 2012). The dignity and rights formerly applicable only to 
nobles were gradually extended to other citizens. Granting rights is a linear, 
expandable process of acknowledging social standing. Judith Shklar has argued 
similarly that the rights that constitute American citizenship ought more 
properly to be called ʻemblemsʼ or badges of honour derived from the 
entitlement to work and to vote (Shklar 2001). On this reading, all citizens 
become ʻnobleʼ when the Civil Code is introduced (leaving slightly unclear the 
question whether the same occurs through time in places where no Civil Code 
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exists) (Whitman 2005).  In this light, the public act of recognising always 
appears as an act of constructing equality, rather than destroying privilege or 
other social statuses. Another example of this is the introduction of the 
Napoleonic Code to states under his control, which extended rights previously 
granted only to privileged estates to all citizens of the state. Citizens were 
recognised as subjects of honour, previously an exclusive privilege of royalty 
and nobility. In the international sphere, the recognition of human rights to all 
humans independently of their former status as mere citizens (Sands 2016), the 
recognition of governments in exile (McGilvray 2010) or fledgling ʻnations in 
waitingʼ has generated another wave of interest in recognition as a mechanism 
of social transformation. (Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik, 2004). The process 
of gradual inclusion of formerly misrcognised subjects into a community of 
citizens or states can thus also been captured by this term, making the concept 
of revolution and, within it, the struggle for state power, almost obsolete. 
In sum, the concept of ʻ recognitionʼ has come to describe social practices 
of enfranchisement as a key aspect of progress. In this context, Hegelʼs work 
on recognition in the fields of aesthetic representation and political philosophy 
has served as a key inspiration, but with few exceptions, these two strands of 
reception were evolving separately (the exceptions include Pippin 2011, 
Kompridis 2013, 2014). Secondly, despite Hegelʼs own, dialectical model of 
recognition, twentieth-century social theorists have focused almost exclusively 
on the ʻinferiorʼ subject as the real agent of change. Often related to ideas such                                                                                                                            
as empowerment (Calvès 2009), the notion of recognition as it has developed 
since Hegel favours the focus on the formerly stigmatised, the recently 
undignified, the perspective of the former ʻbondsmanʼ over the former lord. Yet 
in historical experience, a key corrollary of social transformations includes 
negative processes, such as the stigmatization of the former stigmatizers, as an 
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essential element in ensuring the equality of subjects thereafter. This is 
particularly reflected in the sphere of representation, including such instances 
as political cartoons or cultural propaganda in revolutionary periods where 
stigmatization or disavowal of privilege often loom larger than the celebration 
of a newly emancipated subject of history. ʻNegativeʼ processes follow a form 
of their own, which is more than just an ʻ inversionʼ of the positive or inclusionary 
direction. Charting the course of status destruction in its social and symbolic 
manifestations could help in thinking through the structural differences which 
are at the heart of lasting political transformations. 
 
 
 
II 
The concept of derecognition  
 
To grasp processes which include elements of destruction or negation of status 
and value in times of political rupture, I propose to use the concept of 
ʻderecognitionʼ. The closest use of the concept in this sense comes from 
Political Theory and the theory of IR. Recently, theorists of international law 
have invoked the idea of a ʻ doctrine of derecognitionʼ as a supposedly new mode 
of soft power conducive to non-violent regime change, suggesting that this 
would constitute a new paradigm for managing such situations (Auron 2013, as 
a critical complement to ʻpositiveʼ recognition theory and IR, e.g. Greenhill 
2008). As a practice of foreign relations, the term has previously appeared in 
the discussion of the status of China and Taiwan in the 1970s (Unger 1979, 
Kayes 1980). In the case of India, the term ʻderecognitionʼ has been applied to 
the incomplete loss of power of the Indian princes between the 1940s and the 
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1970s, describing the abrogation of privileges in the princely states by the 
government of independent India in the 1970s (Richter 1971). The term was 
also used in the 1970s, when the United States derecognised Taiwan as a 
legitimate government of China (Unger 1979, Kayes 1980). In earlier historical 
periods, such interventions were conceptualised under different terms, such as 
the struggle against tyranny, humanitarian intervention, anarchism, and the 
fight against totalitarianism.  
However, the notion of derecognising governments has also been present 
in the political discourses of the nineteenth and twentieth century. At its most 
categorical is the non-recognition of all governments by anarchist theorists and 
activists (Cf. Vincent 2011). Perhaps most famous in this regard are the words 
of the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, according to whom the states of 
Europe of his time, ʻ[l]ike worn-out old men, their skin shrivelled and their feet 
stumbling, gnawed at by moral sicknesses, incapable of embarking on the tide 
of new ideasʼ were living ʻon credit on their pastʼ, and by doing so, merely 
hastened ʻtheir ends by squabbling like aged gossips.ʼ (Kropotkin 1992, 24). 
Categorically denying legitimacy to governments in their modern form also 
obviously remained an important tradition for Marx, and later for Lenin. But in 
the longer history of political theory, too, the idea of revoking the legitimacy of 
governments looked back on an older tradition: the discourses on the right of 
resistance to tyrants and illegitimate governments that was associated with 
Protestant and other dissident movements in early modern Europe (Cf. 
Baumgoldt 2007, 27-51; Schwoerer 1993). 
Today, the notion of ʻderecognitionʼ as a practice is most widely invoked 
in financial theory and accounting (Opperman 2008, Subramani 2009, Law and 
Owen 2010), and bargaining (Korczynski and Ritson 2000). However, what I 
think is needed is to make the concept available for the description of a dual 
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perspective on the process of status depreciation for individuals, as well as 
institutions and things. For example, it can be used to describe those who 
revoke othersʼ rights, such as in cases when some groups or political 
communities cease to consider a government to be a legitimate holder of power 
and speak or act so as to make their views public. It can also capture the 
process and the experience of being derecognised, i.e. the subjective 
perception of becoming a ʻformerʼ person or sharing a lifeworld with one. More 
broadly, a social theory of ʻderecognitionʼ can be used to emphasise the 
significance of practices of shaming or discrediting former holders of power, or 
the withering away of privilege, which occurs in the shadow of more widely 
publicised acts of recognition, such as proclamations of or demands for rights. 
Conceptualised in this sense, the practice of derecognition nonetheless 
deserves special attention both from theorists and from empirical social 
scientists.  
It is important to distinguish ʻderecognitionʼ as used above from 
seemingly similar terms which are widely used by recognition theorists, such as 
non-recognition, misrecogniton, or inferiorisation. These are all terms which 
theorists including Axel Honneth and Judith Butler have construed as the logical 
negative complements of ʻrecognitionʼ. For instance, one could argue that 
women tend to be not recognised as political subjects in premodern patriarchal 
societies. But they are not derecognised, because in these societies they have 
never been recognised in the first place. Equally, in some societies, an ethnic 
group could be misrecognised as inferior and subject to persecution. Societies 
that consider themselves modern tend to derecognise and thus delegitimate 
schemas that they consider traditional.  
In terms of social ontology, derecognition could be described as the 
performance of acts (economic, legal, and intellectual) by which existing 
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statuses (de facto as well as de jure) are conferred to new groups. The need 
for such a mechanism is most evident in civil and international criminal law, 
when a state deprives groups of rights that it had formerly granted them, or 
when a community of states no longer acknowledges another state as 
legitimate.  
Among the earliest instances I could find of using the concept of 
ʻderecognitionʼ to describe the relationship between civil society and 
governments was an article by the Russian legal theorist and social activist 
Benjamin Mandel (1863-1931). Mandel lived in exile in Finland and later in 
Berlin after the revolution of 1917. Writing in a German journal specialising in 
comparative law, he spoke of the derecognition of the Soviet government by 
former subjects of the Russian empire (Mandel 1921). In the early to mid-
twentieth century, the term generally featured in literature covering a range of 
uncertain outcomes of revolutionary situations, such as the expatriation of 
populations and the status of governments in exile (Mandel 1921, Lauterpacht 
1927, 1928 and 1945, Kelsen 1941). However, this usage then appears to have 
faded from attention, even though in the contexts of civil and constitutional law, 
the term ʻderecognitionʼ [Aberkennung] had been most developed in German 
legal theory to describe anomalous cases of denaturalization (See, for instance, 
Schnitzler 1871). Denaturalization, banishment and expatriation --- all known 
legal practices since at least the Roman Empire ‒ were a common practice of 
the German princely states, applied to such known personalities as the Grimm 
brothers. (Martus 2009). (It has most recently been brought to popular attention 
in the discussion of the expatriation of Donald Trumpʼs ancestor from Bavaria.) 
(Trump 1905/2017). In this context, the practice was especially problematised 
in Weimar constitutional debates (Goltsche 1922).  
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Thus, the theme of repurposing former habits of privileged groups is 
particularly salient in Max Weberʼs lecture on Politics as a Vocation. Weber 
called the nobility a ʻpolitically recyclable, non-estate based stratumʼ (Weber 
1919). He was against the intervention of actual former nobles in modern 
politics, but he advocated the conversion of noble values into modern politics. 
In short, intellectuals who lived through revolutions and, to some extent, actively 
participated in establishing new regimes, like Max Weber and Georg Lukács, 
have left a far richer repository of concepts than the previous focus on the 
ʻstateʼ and on ʻrecognitionʼ has allowed for. Thetheoretical interest in the 
consciousness of representatives of formerly governing elites was also shared 
by contemporary French historians in the interwar era. According to Maurice 
Halbwachs and Marc Bloch, the nobility was a prime example for the 
persistence of privileged social groups through the function of collective 
ʻcadresʼ of memory, akin to the Platonic ‚Ideaʼ (Bloch 1939/1949). Maurice 
Halbwachs, writing in the 1920s, used the nobility as a prime example for 
arguing that social groups and classes were historically malleable and able to 
redefine themselves from within; social classes relatively were groups who 
äpossess, or who do not possess the kind of qualities most appreciated in their 
societyʼ (Halbwachs 1925, 398). 
The political and social thought of theorists who lived through several 
revolutions. Georg Lukács´s early reflections of 1923 is especially pertinent in 
this regard, since Lukács had the cases of Russia, Germany, and also Béla 
Kún´s Hungary, before his eyes (Lukács 1923).  As already mentioned, the 
central term for Lukács was consciousness, not recognition, but he paid 
particular attention to the place and subjectivity of social groups whose status 
was changing in revolutionary periods. Articulating a concern for the success of 
the revolutionary project, he observed how groups like the petty bourgeoisie, 
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but also nobles who effectively should by now embrace the class consciousness 
of the bourgeoisie, will inadvertently act ʻpast their destinyʼ [ʻam Schicksal 
vorbei handelnʼ] ‒ i..e. behave in ways which contradicts the logic of their 
supposed interests under a dialectical conception of progress (Lukács 1923, 
70-72). This process is described in more detail in History and Class 
Consciousness. As he put it there, the ʻconsciousnessʼ can in fact lag behind 
the historical process, so that a social group can think of itself as a ʻKnight of 
the Reformation eraʼ and as that  ʻparticular segment of society, which draws 
benefits from privilegesʼ. Yet at the same time, as an estate, this segment can 
be ʻeconomically already entirely decomposed, its members can economically 
already belong to different classes [his emphasis] whilst retaining this 
(objectively unreal) ideological composure.ʼ The reason for this was that the 
consciousness of an estate drew its legitimacy not from ʻreal, living economic 
unityʼ but a ʻfixation upon a past society which had once legitimated its estate-
based privileges.ʼ (Lukacs 1923, 69-70). 
In this broader sense of a social practice with political implications, the 
concept of ʻderecognitionʼ  has particular pertinence for understanding changes 
of status times of political instability. As I suggest, the concept has an untapped 
potential for describing processes by which governments, groups, or individuals 
can recalibrate social statuses through a combination of formal and informal 
social practice. In the next and last section, I will turn to three areas in which it 
might usefully guide empirical understandings of these.  
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III 
Some empirical cases of derecognition 
 
Twentieth-century history provides rich empirical material which can be 
usefully analysed through a focus on the relationship between repeated 
informal practices and actual change of social and political status. However, in 
many cases historians have discussed the relevant cases in separate contexts. 
I do not suggest that such contextual diversity should remain unaccounted for; 
however, using a common conceptual vocabulary to identify connections 
between a range of different empirical case studies which are not typically 
connected in the scholarship of their respective fields can contribute to a more 
granular understanding of the past. The examples I will discuss include the 
changing status of previously privileged social groups, either within a political 
community or transnationally; the shaming of governments by their own 
citizens; and the devaluation of artefacts previously recognised as valuable. 
Most examples can be contextualised within the history of central and eastern 
Europe in the early to mid-twentieth century, but these are also applicable to a 
wider range of situations.  
The first case study pertains to the history of Europeʼs postimperial 
transformation in the twentieth century, particularly, to the revolutions in the 
Russian and German empires (1917-1922). Whilst proceeding with different 
degrees of radicalism, these tectonic shifts in the socioeconomic and political 
makeup of central and eastern Europe had some features in common too, and 
historians have recently highlighted these cross-imperial connections and 
parallels (Gatrell 2007, Gerwarth and Manela 2014, Smele 2016, Gusejnova 
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2016, Smith 2017, Chernev 2017). One of these was the depreciation of status 
forms which had been considered privileged under the old regimes. 
In most successor states to Europeʼs empires, Europeʼs old elites were 
divested of power  (Reif 1994 and 2000, Wehler 1990). Despite different degrees 
of radicalism, the revolutionary and republican regimes emerging across a wide 
area reaching from the Urals to the Rhine did have some common policies. The 
Bolsheviks took an essentialist approach to people of formerly privileged status, 
suggeesting that being noble was nearly equivalent to doing something. Class 
could not simpy be removed like a cloak or a badge, even though social 
historians have subsequently shown how the Soviet regime ultimately ascribed 
class rather than identifying or discovering ʻitʼ (cf. Fitzpatrick 1993). The 
relevant Bolshevik Decree of 10 November 1917 (23 November, according to 
the new calendar) abolished noble status together with several other estates 
associated with imperial governance: the clergy, the merchants and other 
privileges associated with life in the city, village dwellers, ethnic aliens or 
inorodtsy (particularly, Jews and the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia), 
and Finnish residents. Another example of Bolshevik practices of derecognition 
was its disavowal and violent persecution of Orthodox clergy. This prompted its 
leading figures to do the same in response, leading to such declarations as 
Patriarch Tikhonʼs Anathema of January 1918.1 Whilst forging a new identity 
which became the essence of Sovietness, this process also created a new social 
group, the lishentsy, or ʻdepriveesʼ, meaning people deprived of their former 
status.  
But the ripples of Bolshevik practices of derecognition transcended the 
boundaries of the emergent Soviet state. ‚When I look at myself sociologically, 
the loss of my landed roots in particular has meant that there was not much left 
 
1 I am grateful to Miriam Dobson for drawing my attention to this point. 
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but to preserve a figure that was, historically speaking, deadʻ(Keyserling 1948). 
Hermann Keyserling was a Baltic German of aristocratic lineage from the 
Russian Empire, who lost his Estonian estate and his title in the revolution of 
1917 and later lectured and wrote about European identity from a base in 
Germany (Gusejnova 2015 and 2016). Cases like his can be of interest to 
historians as well as to social theorists for its discussion of the subjective 
experience of status change. The disavowal of the different privileges of nobles 
took a different legal form and had diverse symbolic representations in newly 
founded Czechoslovakia, in the Baltic states and in the German republic. 
Considering such examples to be case studies of ʻderecognition practiceʼ might 
be helpful in establishing a context for comparison, as well as drawing attention 
to the social and psychological context in which entire social strata were 
ʻdemotedʼ. These ranged from socially stigmatizing formerly superior groups to 
their physical extermination.  
The notion of ʻformer peopleʼ as a legal-historical term had been around 
since the French Revolution, which brought into circulation the idea of the ci-
devant. The early Soviet ideologues developed this term through the concept of 
byvshye lyudi (i.e., ʻpeople of the old regimeʼ), applying it not only to nobles and 
royalty, but also to major landowners, clergymen, and merchants. Because the 
Soviet case was so radical, it was often considered in isolation from other 
European examples. However, linking this example to less violent practices of 
stigmatization might enable historians to utilise more transnational and 
comparative approaches of the European revolutions. The case of Keyserling, 
the Baltic Baron and Russian subject turned German citizen, is a good 
biographical example of the need for such perspectives. As someone whose 
original deprivation of status was associated with the Bolsheviks, he spent his 
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subsequent life in the politically ʻmilderʼ climate of the German republican 
regime, before the Nazis enforced his renewed commitment to the Aryan race.  
Using the term ʻderecognitionʼ across the borders of these different 
postimperial successor states would enable historians and theorists to capture 
an essential similarity behind the logic of these practices. Historians studying 
these regions have analysed not only the declining social status of aristocratic 
families, but also their adaptation to changing circumstances in the context of 
what Arno Mayer famously called the ʻpersistence of the old regimeʼ (Mayer 81; 
Wehler 1990; Reif 2000; Conze and Wienfort 2004; Reif 2000, Wienfort 2006). 
What is interesting in this context is the relationship between economic and 
symbolic power and political power, but also, the subjective experience of those 
formerly privileged individuals and groups. 
The revolutionary and republican regimes in Europe around 1917 
developed a wide range of cultural practices aimed at diminishing the power of 
the social groups associated with the ʻold regimeʼ. In Germany, not one but 
twenty two revolutions occurred between 1917 and 1920, yet this period is not 
typically discussed as a ʻGerman Revolutionʼ. In addition to the Hohenzollerns, 
three kings (of the Wittelsbach, Wettiner, and Württemberg families), six grand 
dukes, five dukes, and seven princes lost their right to rule in their regional 
states. In Austria, in addition to a law dubbed the Habsburgergesetz, which 
outlawed specifically Habsburg claims to sovereignty in the dynastyʼs former 
heartland, the use of noble titles was outlawed. Nobles of Germanic background 
also lost power In Estonia and Poland, laws passed in 1920 and 1921 also 
abolished all noble titles, while in Lithuania and Latvia, references to noble 
privilege were simply omitted from their new constitutions.  
The notion of ʻderecognitionʼ and its social implications could help to 
contextualise the debates of Weimar jurists on different sides of the political 
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spectrum at a time of Germanyʼs political transition from empire to republic. 
These jurists were concerned with building a new republican tradition, in which 
political allegiance to the German republic was to be married to the aim of 
achieving constitutional equality between German states, as well as the equality 
of privileges among German subjects (Goltsche 2010, Jacobsen and Schlink 
2000, Kelly 2003 and 2004). In this context, one major constitutional debate 
revolved around the question of measures of expropriation against former 
princely rulers, as well as the status of their symbolic privileges (Schmitt 1926: 
25-7, Wehler 1990, Reif 2000). When it comes to the subjective experience of 
losing privilege, for historians, the importance of non-conversion among the 
military elites of Europeʼs old empires is a important theme in recent historical 
research (Ziemann 2013, Matzerath and Marburg 2001). ʻ Noble consciousnessʼ, 
or Adelsbewusstsein, is now often studied based on primary sources based on 
individual or group biographies and family histories (Conze 2000; Malinowski 
2003; Glassheim 2005). 
As social scientists working with historical material, like Sofia 
Tchouikina, have shown, the process of making Soviet citizenship revealed a 
complex set of adaptation practices involving the conversion of a wide range of 
habitus and skills (Tchouikina 2017). Looking at twentieth-century Poland, the 
anthropologist Longina Jakubowska has observed that aristocratic identity 
persisted there in the linguistic and social juxtapositon of the term pan (the 
word for ʻsirʼ) with the term cham, and also through the distinction between the 
szlachta (the community of gentry) and the Jews. When pan became widely 
available to all educated Poles, the words cham and ʻJewʼ became markers of 
national identity. The notion of racial difference became important not only for 
the palingenetic myths of nations, but also for supranational types of racism 
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such as the Nazi idea of the Aryan race. Each new type of ʻsirʼ creates a 
psychological counter-image of a new ʻboor.ʼ (Jakubowska 2012).  
Cultural historians working on this period of central and eastern 
European history might be interested in using the concept of ʻderecognitionʼ to 
analyse the removal of symbolism from streets and public buildings, which is 
associated with the privilege of former groups. This is of course best known 
through case studies such as the stripping of imperial symbolism in 
revolutionary Russia, which had been buit up around the imperial family 
particularly in the last century of its existence (Wortman 2000, on revolutionary 
symbolism, see Figes and Kolonitsky 1999, Bonnell 1996). Less well known is 
the less spectacular symbolic vocabulary of depreciating empire in Weimar 
Germany. There was debate, around 1918, whether to blow up the statues of 
Prussian kings adorning the Alley of Victory [ʻSiegesalleeʼ] in Berlin, an 
unpopular project initiated by Wilhelm II to commemorate the defeat of France 
in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/71 and derisively called ʻAlley of Puppetsʼ 
by Berliners. It had only been completed in 1901 and included a genealogical 
parade of German rulers from Albrecht of Prussia, the last grand master of the 
Teutonic Order, to the Prussian King Wilhelm I. The revolutionary debate 
prompted the satirist Kurt Tucholsky to ask: ʻ What will come of the Siegesallee? 
Will they drive it out of the city towards the New Lake because it is too royalist, 
too autocratic and too monarchist? […] Will they maintain the statues but place 
new heads on the same necks? […] And was all that learning of their names for 
my exams in vain?ʼ (Tiger/Tucholsky 1918). Conceptualising these cases 
through the term ʻderecognitionʼ would enable historians to compare the 
postimperial transformation of European society in contemporaneous epochs 
and under different political regimes. 
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Another set of historical case studies which could be usefully captured 
with the concept of ʻ derecognitionʼ is the disavowal of governments by their own 
citizens as well as by the international community. Just as governments can 
derecognise their own citizens in the act of denaturalization, citizens as well as 
other societies and international powers can derecognise governments. They 
do this by means of soft power, diplomatic channels, or informal relations. Both 
of these aspects in the relationship between governments and people flared up 
as four empires crumbled in the wake of the First World War, and the treaties 
of Paris, Versailles, Trianon and Brest-Litovsk came to represent the rather 
shifting landscape constituting the international community. Hannah Arendt 
has famously described this moment as initiating a series of disappointments 
with the promises of the nation-state (Arendt 1951, 269, in ʻThe Decline of the 
Nation-state and the End of the Rights of Manʼ). But the crisis in recognition in 
the aftermath of imperial collapse implies a multiple sense of institutional 
failures: empires and their successors derecognised their subjects through acts 
of genocide and ethnic cleansing, as empires broke down their various 
constituent parts, comprising associations formed on political, ethnic, and 
religious grounds, derecognised the old elites, while non-continental powers 
such as Britain and the United States saw themselves confronted with a range 
of choices towards the new powers as well. 
The aftermaths of the two World Wars, are a particularly fertile ground 
for studying notions of ʻderecognitionʼ. In the first instance, this was due to the 
heightened interest in the recognition of governments by legal theorists, 
historians, as well as diplomatic stafff involved in representing the old European 
powers in times of rapid political change (Lippman 1919, Lauterpacht 1927a, 
1927b, and 1928, Melʼgunov 1929, Noble 1935; Lauterpacht 2013/1947, Epstein 
1959, Shulʼgin 1984). Anti-Bolshevik parties involved in the Russian Civil War, 
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intellectuals and military personnel associated with the counterrevolutionary 
ʻWhite Movementʼ repeatedly denounced the emergent Bolshevik regime, 
informally derecognising what was de facto, and eventually also de jure, a 
sovereign power (Katzer 1999, Wiederkehr 2007). From this basis, they 
published journals and other widely read works in print, in which they not only 
denounced Russiaʼs revolutionary regime, but exposed its corruptibility (Raeff 
1990). In the absence of a legal heir to the monarchy, and living in exile, they 
nonetheless held on to organisations such as the Zemgor, the regional types of 
self-government which disintegrated with the empire.  
Yet another context in which the term ʻderecognitionʼ might apply to the 
relationship between governments and civil societies in Weimar and Nazi 
Germany, highlighting some of the connections in the social histories of both 
regimes which are often sidelined. In the Weimar period, a legal initiative known 
as the ʻ Radbruch Draftʼ, associated with the work of the jurist Gustav Radbruch, 
spelled out in detail the legal foundations of the possibility of civil litigation 
against police injustice and criminal behaviour that can be ascribed to state 
representatives (Goltsche 2010). A similar moment of ʻ derecognitionʼ by citizens 
of govenments can be observed in the case of populations who were exiled or 
expatriated due to the rise of Nazi Germany. Using the concept of ʻThe Other 
Germanyʼ in the 1930s and 1940s, inspired by the Weimar-era liberal and 
pacifist newspaper Das andere Deutschland  [The other Germany] (founded in 
1925), exiles rallied support for what could be described as an informal 
Germany in exile, or a ʻhumanist frontʼ (Berendsohn 1949).  
This cultural alternative to a derecognised state could be usefully 
compared to the emergence of governments in exile representing French, Polish 
or Czechoslovak dissidents with varying degrees of diplomatic and institutional 
formality (on governments in exile, cf. Oppenheimer 1942, more recently, Shain 
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and Linz 1995, Conway and Gotovitch 2001, McGilvray 2010). The concept of 
ʻderecognitionʼ would be capacious enough to allow scholars to evaluate the 
relative impact of cultural, diplomatic and military powers in enabling or 
disabling the recognition of governments by their own as well as by foreign 
constituents. 
 To mention a third case briefly, the ideological depreciation of previously 
valuable cultural artefacts could also be considered as a practice of 
derecognition. Once again, the period concerned is the series of 
transformations in the structure of legitimation in central and eastern Europe, 
from the collapse of its empires to the defeat of the Third Reich. Such a broad 
conceptualisation of a century of extremes, which has been made popular again 
recently by the historiographical perspectives offered by Timothy Snyder and 
others (Snyder 2010, Gerwarth and Horne 2012). It could be fruitfully deepened 
by looking at the function of cultural policy in the period of radical social 
transformation through the lens of derecognition. Key institutions such as the 
early Academy for the Study of the Arts in Soviet Russia, the 
Reichskulturkammer in Nazi Germany, and other bodies, were responsible for 
backing to the construction of new ideologies.  
 The work of the aforementioned Russian philosopher Gustav Špet might 
serve as a biographical example here. Despite being at the forefront of efforts 
to unify Marxist-Leninist perspectives on aesthetics in the early years of Soviet 
rule, he eschewed the conventions of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and instead 
became an object of the new regimeʼs ʻderecognitionʼ of bourgoeois 
philosophical doctrines. Špetʼs name made it to the infamous list of undesirable 
philosophers that Lenin ordered out of the country in 1922 on the ʻ Philosopherʼs 
steamerʼ. Due to Špetʼs refusal to emigrate, however, he not only failed to find 
a hearing in western Europe until the twenty-first century, but also precluded a 
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reception in Russian contexts. Špet was executed among mass arrests in 1937, 
and his work has only recently received detailed attention from historians 
(Plotnikov 2013). But considered in context, Špetʼs work on Hegelʼs concept of 
recognition provides a fascinating insight into the practice of derecognition at 
the level of science and culture. 
The styles and approaches in the visual arts, intellectual history and 
music, which were endorsed were intimately connected with ideas about old 
and new regimes  (Plotnikov 2013, or, for a primary source, Ziegler 1938). Rather 
than viewing the emergence and later persecution of the cultural avantgardes 
in Soviet Russia, Weimar and later Nazi Germany, as separate instances, the 
concept of derecognition could help conceptualise the social process by which 
such collective decisions to depreciate entire directions of thought and culture 
were made or became acceptable. This understanding of the role of informal 
social practice in providing political legitimacy has been more common in 
studies of the Cold War, but it is yet to be linked conceptually to our 
understanding of the earlier twentieth century (Cf. Scott-Smith and 
Krabbendam 2003, and others, including Gusejnova 2016). 
 
 
What I have suggested here is that thinking conceptually about a variety of 
social practices as instances of ʻderecognitionʼ can reveal previously unseen 
connections in European history. The empirical examples can add texture and 
complexity to the established theories of recognition. It is worth thinking about 
the fact that Hegel himself, despite writing in the wake of the French Revolution, 
ultimately ended up celebrating the Prussian state -- the very opposite of a 
revolutionary polity. What remained crucial for those influenced by his work was 
the connection between consciousness and conceptions of progress. But what 
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has faded from attention among social theorists, if not philosophers (e.g. Pippin 
2011), was Hegelʼs own comprehension of the link between aesthetic and 
political representation on the one hand, and social transformation on the other.  
Even though the above examples stem from European case studies, as I 
have indicated, the term ʻderecognitionʼ can be equally fruitful in examining the 
process of alternative sovereignty formation beyond Europe. Examples might 
include the process of decolonisation, notably in India (Copland 1997), or the 
social practices emerging in republican China (Harrison 2000). Enriching the 
conceptual vocabulary of recognition theory with attention to the social 
practices of derecognition could contribute to the development of a critical 
theory of modern ideologies (Bourdieu 1972, Honneth 1986, Burke 2005, 
Freeden 2013). Such a theory of derecognition could help to conceptualise the 
importance of informal practices for political status changes, and do so in a way 
that would be politically agnostic towards the ideology prevalent in a particular 
society. In this way, it might also provide a useful heuristic for empirical work 
on various historical phenomena connected to social change. 
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